The Personal Distributed Environment (PDE) is a new concept arising in personal communications beyond 3G (B3G). This paper briefly describes the environment, surveys the protocols available to provide PDE authentication, and assesses their suitability for adaptation to the PDE.
Introduction
A Personal Distributed Environment (PDE) [8] is a collection of devices and services that are able to communicate with each other dynamically, via mobile, wireless and wired technologies [8] [1] . The concept is illustrated in Figure 1 . Implicit in this model is the existence of a PDE Security Registry, or PSR. This is a logical entity that stores the PDE security parameters. The PSR may be distributed, but it is assumed that it is secure and always accessible to all devices that make up the PDE.
The creation of such a heterogeneous and dynamic network raises many technical issues. While the general security issues arising from this environment are described in [21] , this paper discusses the specific challenge of mutual authentication. Although the PDE encompasses both wired and wireless technologies, the focus of this paper is on wireless authentication. Communications over wireless networks are inherently more susceptible to eavesdropping than communications over wired networks. This makes them more susceptible to Man in the Middle (MitM) attacks. These attacks can include the modification of data, replay attacks or even the hijacking of communication channels. PDE devices will be roaming in domains with which they have had no prior relationship; moreover, these wireless domains may have limited authentication capabilities. An authentication protocol suite is required for the PDE which can counteract the threats arising in a wireless environment. Furthermore, authentication must work on a wide range of platforms and legacy networks. The objective, therefore, is to establish a protocol suite which can support legacy authentication mechanisms in heterogeneous wireless networks.
PDE Authentication requirements
There are four classes of mutual authentication arising within the PDE: authenticating a third party device, a third party service, registering a new PDE device, and general PDE internal communication. Each situation will require a slightly different authentication mechanism.
When the user adds a new device to the PDE, it will be registered, and security credentials created and stored in the PSR. Subsequent communications will then require proof of knowledge of these security credentials. This situation becomes more complex when the user does not own or manage the device to be added, for example, if the device is a publicly available printer or display. In this case, the user may not have the access rights on the device required to complete the registration process. Furthermore, the device may be in a remote location. Since the PSR is a logical entity it is quite likely that the device will be geographically remote from the server it needs to perform an authentication with. It is this scenario that will be considered in this paper.
Currently there are a number of mechanisms available to provide mutual authentication in this scenario, including mechanisms using smart cards, PKI-based mechanisms [19] , AKA [6] , and CHAP [22] . However, the heterogeneous nature of the PDE means that many different technologies and corresponding security mechanisms need to be supported. This effectively prevents the adoption of a homogeneous authentication protocol for the entire PDE. The approach taken to authentication, therefore, is required to support a wide range of existing authentication protocols.
Existing authentication mechanisms
There are a large number of authentication mechanisms that satisfy most of the requirements for a PDE remote authentication mechanism. This section surveys the more common mechanisms and identifies their vulnerabilities when applied to the PDE.
MSCHAP v2
Microsoft Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol version 2 (MSCHAP v2) [15] is the default authentication mechanism used by MS Windows 2000. Unlike CHAP [22] , MSCHAP v2 does not require that an unencrypted shared secret be stored by the server and client. Instead, a one-way cryptographic hash of the password is stored by the server. The client must then prove knowledge of the password by using the same hashing method the server uses to "reproduce" the correct hash [15] .
MSCHAP v2 piggybacks a peer challenge on the response packet, and an authenticator response on the success packet. It uses a one-way hash algorithm in combination with a shared secret and a challenge. This enables the server to verify client knowledge of the shared secret. However it is only base-level authentication (user names and passwords), so does not provide 'strong' security.
The client sends their identity to the authenticator in the clear. In the wireless environment of the PDE, this would expose the PDE identity. One of the main PDE security requirements is to protect user privacy and provide identity confidentiality.
EAP-MD5
EAP -Message Digest 5 (EAP-MD5) [5] is an EAP [2] equivalent to CHAP, which uses ID and passwords to provide authentication. This makes it vulnerable to dictionary attacks, where a malicious entity uses a database of possible passwords to try and guess the password for a particular user. In the first wave of messages, the server requests the client's ID, which is sent in the clear. In a wireless environment the PDE's ID would thus be sent in the clear and the user's privacy would be at risk.
It is relatively easy for a malicious party to 'sniff' station identities and password hashes, or to perform dictionary attacks. Consequently, Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks are possible. Malicious entities can masquerade as access points (APs), and trick the clients into authenticating to the rouge AP. As MitM attacks are possible, the EAP-MD5 protocol puts the client's session at risk of being hijacked.
Therefore since EAP-MD5 does not provide mutual authentication, or key derivation, and is vulnerable to MitM attacks, it is not suitable for use in to the PDE environment.
EAP-SIM
EAP-SIM [9] is a smartcard based mutual authentication mechanism that utilizes the GSM [16] roaming authentication infrastructure. The SIM contains encryption facilities, information about the device and user, and provides identity privacy by using pseudonyms. However, EAP-SIM is vulnerable to spoofing. A malicious entity can carry out a "rogue base station attack". This involves building a false base station and replaying challenges. From the responses, it is possible to obtain the user's authentication keys [17] , [22] . Moreover, known weaknesses in GSM can force the client to use vulnerable encryption algorithms [17] .
In the EAP-SIM protocol, the client sends their ID to the authenticator in the clear. Furthermore, a malicious entity is also able to transmit a request for the true identity of the client. If the client responds, the PDE's ID would be exposed, compromising user privacy. Finally, with EAP-SIM, session independence is not provided, so it will be possible to re-use the credentials in any communication.
EAP-AKA
EAP Authentication and Key Agreement (EAP-AKA) [6] is an improved version of EAP-SIM which stores the encryption algorithms on the device rather then the SIM card and makes use of stronger long-term secret keys. However, as is the case with EAP-SIM, the client's identity is still sent to the server in the clear.
EAP-TLS
In EAP-TLS [1] mutual authentication is achieved by using digital certificates and requiring both client and server to authenticate each other. Although this provides mutual authentication, the use of digital certificates requires a supporting public key infrastructure, which can have a high maintenance cost. The use of public key cryptography also places high demands on the computational resources of both the client and server. Moreover, as with the previous protocols, EAP-TLS also exposes the user's identity. One way to address these threats is to establish secure tunnels before applying the protocols. This is discussed in the next section.
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Authentication protocols designed for wired environments possess certain vulnerabilities when applied to a heterogeneous environment such as the PDE. A major concern is exposure of information on the wireless network that not only compromises privacy but may lead to more sophisticated attacks. By setting up an encrypted TLS tunnel first, all subsequent authentication messages can be protected from exposure. The concept is illustrated in Figure 2 . Our requirement for a tunnelling protocol is primarily to protect the user's identity from eavesdroppers. It should also protect the authentication protocol messages to reduce the threat from MitM attacks. Finally the protocol should provide mutual authentication, rather than authenticating only one party. This section examines the suitability of several tunnelled authentication protocols for use with the PDE. 
LEAP
PEAP
Protected Extensible Authentication Protocol (PEAP) [3] , is a two-step mutual authentication protocol. It authenticates the server by using digital certificates to set up a symmetric encryption tunnel then authenticates the client using EAP through the encrypted tunnel. Server certificates are required to authenticate the server to the client, but client certificates are optional.
PEAP is vulnerable to the MitM attacks described in section 4.4, and also only allows the inner protocols to be EAP. We cannot be that restrictive in the PDE.
TTLS
Tunnelled TLS (TTLS) [12] is similar to PEAP [3] in that it uses a two step authentication method. Firstly the server is authenticated to the client based on the use of certificates. The client then sets up credentials for the encrypted TLS tunnel.
Once the encrypted tunnel is established the client is authenticated to the server. TTLS supports the authentication methods described in the previous sections, and can be extended to support new protocols as required. Although TTLS does not directly expose the client's ID, it may still be possible to recover this from the certificates used in the second stage of the protocol. It is also susceptible to the MitM attacks described in 4.4.
Tunnelled Protocol Comparisons
The properties of LEAP, PEAP and TTLS are compared in Although the client ID is protected, encrypted TLS tunnels are still vulnerable to MitM attacks in certain scenarios [4] . For example, attacks of this type are possible if a client uses the same legacy protocol with the same credentials in other Client [2] Client authenticates to server via legacy authentication. Communications protected by TLS tunnel TTP AP Server [1] Authenticate Server to client via Server side certificates.
[3] Mutual Authentication Complete environments where tunnelling is not used, or if the client fails to verify the server certificate properly in the first step of authentication. Figure 3 illustrates how such attacks may be carried out. and forwards them to the client. [5] When remote authentication has been successful, MitM derives the session keys from the keys it is using in the tunnel, and hijacks the client's connection. As described in [4] , one way to defeat this type of attack is to bind the inner and outer stages of the protocols. This ensures that whoever was taking part in the second half of the mutual authentication, also took part in the first half of the protocols.
Binding protocols
Two mechanisms have been proposed in [4] to bind the first and second stages of tunnelled authentication protocols. These mechanisms use either a compound Message Authentication Code (MAC) or compound keys.
The former computes a MAC using keying data from each of the authentication methods in the protocol. This proves that both client and server are aware of the outcome of the authentication. The compound MAC computation includes data about the authentication result (success/failure) sent by each entity. Thus, in the attack described above, the MitM cannot force the server to use a key that the client is unaware of.
Compound keys work in a similar manner by combining keying material from all the authentication methods to derive the keys used for subsequent encryption and authentication. This section describes two binding protocols that may be applied to the PDE to provide secure tunnels for authentication.
EAP -FAST
EAP -Flexible Authentication via secure tunnelling (EAP-FAST) [7] is similar to PEAP [3] , which uses symmetric cryptography, rather than public key cryptography and certificates, to set up the encrypted tunnel. It then uses the pre-established Protected Access Credential key (PAC key) to perform mutual authentication with the client. A secret key set up by the server and the client is used to set up the secure tunnel; this key is refreshed and managed as part of the protocol. As there may be different EAP-FAST authentication servers to which a client may wish to authenticate, this secret key must be uniquely identified by the corresponding server.
Keying material from the inner and outer authentication methods are used to create a compound session key. This is then used to create a compound MAC which is sent in a Crypto-Binding TLV along with a 32-octet random server nonce (with its last bit set to 0). This insures that the entities took part in both the tunnel set up, and the inner legacy authentication method. The Client must respond to the Crypto-Binding TLV in order to complete the authentication process using the same server nonce (but with its last bit set to 1) and will compute the compound MAC using the same method as the server. This proves that the client took part in both the Tunnel authentication and the EAP authentication.
EAP-MD5-Tunneled
EAP-MD5-Tunneled [11] is a protocol designed for use solely within an encrypted TLS tunnel. This protocol uses a compound MD5 MAC [11] , where the MD5 "digest" operation is spilt in two. The client responds to a challenge with an intermediate result from the MD5 algorithm. When the server receives the response it completes the MD5 algorithm. The server now has a challenge and a response which are identical to the challenge and response which CHAP produces. EAP-MD5-Tunneled can also be used to secure EAP-MD5-Challenge [5] , and CHAP [22] authentication. This can be achieved by creating the tunnel between the client and server, then converting the messages into CHAP or MD5 challenges to be forwarded from the tunnelled server to the PDE AAA Server for MD5 challenges to work. 
Conclusions
This paper has described the problem of mutual authentication between B3G devices in a PDE. Although the challenge of supporting diverse legacy authentication mechanisms may be addressed by EAP methods [2] , the threats of eavesdropping and subsequent MitM attacks remain. Tunnelled TLS [12] may counter the eavesdropping threat but not the MitM attack. This last threat, however, may be countered by the use of the binding protocols described in section 5.
If we assume that the PSR is located within an AAA server, then we can use a Tunnelling protocol such as TTLS to provide Mutual authentication and protect whichever authentication messages the remote device wishes to use. However we would need to be either assured that the remote device only ever authenticates using encrypted TLS Tunnels; otherwise the session may be hijacked. If this assurance cannot be obtained then a protocol such as EAP-FAST should be implemented, so that the PDE knows it is authenticating through a tunnel set up by the remote device.
The authentication mechanisms reviewed in this paper are all link layer protocols. Future work will consider the use of protocols at higher layers, for example PANA, which may be used on top of EAP to provide end-to-end authentication.
